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Rivers: Same-Sex Couples in America

THE PLIGHT OF BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES IN
AMERICA
Michael Rivers*
“Every day, we live with the very real possibility that,
despite following every law and every policy of the
United States, Tim will be forced to leave the country,
and I will be left without my caretaker and the love of
my life.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Independently, immigration and same-sex marriage are contentious issues in the United States. However, the effect these issues
have on each other is seldom considered in mainstream debates over
either issue. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 2 imposes
numerical quotas on the number of aliens3 permitted to immigrate into the United States.4 Immigrant visas are allocated in accordance
with a preference system, which limits eligibility to categories estab-

*

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. 2011; Southern Connecticut State
University, B.S. 2002 in Communications; Hunter College, Master of Urban Affairs 2005. I
want to start by thanking God for all of the blessings that He or She has bestowed upon me.
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also like to thank Professor Douglas Scherer for being an excellent advisor for this project,
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1
Immigration Equality Hails Government Decision Allowing Lesbian and Gay Couples to
File Green Card Applications, NEWSRX, Apr. 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 27684571
(discussing United States citizen Edwin Blesch’s concern over the potential deportation of
his husband and South African national, Tim Smulian).
2
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2011).
3
Milestones: 1945-1952, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/19451952/ImmigrationAct (last visited May 2, 2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’
means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”).
4
8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)-(3) (2011).
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lished by the INA.5 However, aliens who are “immediate relatives”
of United States citizens are exempt from the numerical quotas.6
Spouses, children, and parents are considered “immediate relatives.”7
Section 1101(b) of the INA defines the terms contained in title II of the Act, which provides for the immigration of immediate
relatives of United States citizens into the United States.8 While the
terms “child” and “parent” are defined with great detail, the Act is silent on how the term “spouse” should be defined.9 Consequently,
courts have been forced to interpret the Congressional intent of the
statute when determining whether people who are partners in legal
same-sex marriages fall within the definition of the term spouse.
In Adams v. Howerton,10 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that “Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses under [the INA].”11 Though Adams was
decided in 1982, it remains binding authority in the Ninth Circuit,
and continues to be persuasive authority in other jurisdictions. As a
consequence of the view adopted by the Ninth Circuit, countless families have been forced to make the painful choice to either be permanently separated from their loved ones or depart from their homeland
for a more accepting society.12 Part II of this Article discusses why
Adams was erroneously decided in 1982 and why it should be overruled today.
Parts III, IV, V, VI, and VII discuss the Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”),13 its past effect on bi-national same-sex couples, and
the reasons it is unconstitutional. Additionally, Part VIII discusses
current challenges to DOMA, and its impact on bi-national same-sex

5

8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2011).
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2011).
7
Id.
8
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (2011).
9
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)-(2) (2011) (defining the terms child and parent, but failing to
define the term spouse).
10
673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
11
Id. at 1041.
12
Congressional Documents, Leahy Introduces Bill to Bring Equality to Lawful Partners
in Immigration Law, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Apr. 14, 2011, available at 2011
WLNR 7322481 (noting that at least twenty-five nations offer immigration benefits to samesex couples, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, The
Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) [hereinafter Congressional Documents].
13
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
6
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couples. Part IX discusses the proposed Uniting American Families
Act (“UAFA”)14 as a possible solution to these challenges. Finally,
Part X is the conclusion of this Article.
II.

ADAMS V. HOWERTON

In Adams v. Howerton,15 United States citizen Richard Adams
and his husband, Australian citizen Anthony Sullivan, appealed the
decision of the Central California District Court, which held that
“two persons of the same sex . . . will not be thought of as being
‘spouses’ to each other within the meaning of the immigration
laws.”16 Adams and Sullivan were married in a ceremony performed
by a minister in Colorado after securing a marriage license from the
County Clerk in Boulder, Colorado.17 Subsequently, Adams filed a
petition with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to
have Sullivan classified as his immediate relative, which was administratively denied.18
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied a two-step analysis to determine when a person is a spouse for purposes of the INA. 19 The
first step is to determine “whether the marriage is valid under state
law”; the second step is to determine “whether [the] state-approved
marriage qualifies under the [INA].”20 The court determined that it
was unclear whether same-sex marriages were permitted under Colorado law and decided the matter based solely on the second step of
the analysis.21 In light of the fact that the term spouse is not defined
in the INA, the court analyzed various factors to ascertain the Congressional intent of excluding immediate relatives from the INA quota limitations.22 The court’s rationale for affirming the district court
was that: (1) substantial deference should be given to the INS’s interpretation of the statute;23 (2) the “ordinary, contemporary, [and]
14
See H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act to accommodate same-sex partners).
15
486 F. Supp 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
16
Id. at 1125.
17
Id. at 1120.
18
Id. at 1120-21.
19
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1039.
22
Id. at 1038-39.
23
Id. at 1040.
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common meaning” of spouse should be applied;24 and (3) other provisions of the INA should be analyzed to determine whether the term
“spouse” was intended to include same-sex marriages because the
statute should be considered as a whole.25
The court stated that “unless there are compelling indications
that it is wrong,” substantial deference should be given to the INS’s
construction of who constitutes a spouse within the meaning of the
INA.26 However, according to the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.”27 The INS’s main contention was that “one cannot be
married to a person of the same sex and thus, if they are of the same
sex, one may not be a spouse to the other.”28 In addition, the INS argued that this was applicable under Colorado and federal law.29
However, as stated by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, it was unclear whether same-sex marriage was permissible under Colorado
law.30 Additionally, there was no federal law at the time that prohibited the recognition of same-sex marriages.31 The INS’s proffered
reason for denying Adam’s petition for Sullivan is clearly arbitrary
and an abuse of discretion.32 The INS premised the denial of the petition on fictional state and federal laws.33 Furthermore, the INS ignored the fact that the marriage license was issued by a state official.34 Instead, it unilaterally determined that same-sex marriage was
impermissible under Colorado and federal law.35 Therefore, the
INS’s finding was arbitrary and an abuse of the discretion that Con-

24

Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
Id.
26
Id. (quoting N.Y. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)).
27
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445
n.29 (1987); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
28
Adams, 486 F. Supp at 1121.
29
Id.
30
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039.
31
Id. at 1039-40.
32
See Bastidas v. I.N.S, 609 F.2d 101, 106 (3rd Cir. 1979) (vacating and remanding the
case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals because of a misapplication of applicable
case law).
33
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039-40.
34
Id. at 1038.
35
Id. at 1040.
25
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gress bestowed upon it to enforce the INA.36
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he term ‘marriage’ ordinarily
contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman. The term
‘spouse’ commonly refers to one of the parties in a marital relationship . . . .”37 The court concluded that it would be inappropriate to
enlarge the ordinary meaning of the words without evidence of Congressional intent to do so.38 This “argument did little more than state
a conclusion [that] lesbians and gay men cannot be spouses because
the law does not recognize [homosexual] relationships.”39 Without
explicitly stating it, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit gave substantial weight to the biases of the majority. However, even though this
reasoning makes the court’s job easier, such reasoning is impermissible. As stated by Chief Justice Burger two years after Adams was decided, “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”40 If court decisions were at the mercy of private biases or popular opinion, states
would still be permitted to enact such legislation as antimiscegenation statutes.41 Moreover, it would still be permissible for
custody disputes to be decided solely based on the race of the parties
involved.42 The court’s decision to defer to the colloquial “common
meaning” of the word “spouse” made its members appear as mere lay
persons making speculations about the law, as opposed to constitutional experts upholding their duty as members of the United States
Court of Appeals.43
The Ninth Circuit reviewed other sections of the INA to determine whether Congress intended the term spouse to include indi-

36

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (internal quotations omitted).
38
Id.
39
Cynthia M. Reed, Note, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 103 (1996).
40
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
41
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). “The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not to marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” Id. at 12.
42
See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (“The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot
justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother
found to be an appropriate person to have such custody.”).
43
Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
37
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viduals in same-sex marriages.44 In doing so, the court found that the
1965 amendments to the INA rendered homosexuals excludable under section 212,45 and concluded that it was “unlikely that Congress
intended to give homosexual spouses preferential admission treatment under section 201(b) of the Act when, in the very same amendments adding that section, it mandated their exclusion. . . . [W]e can
only conclude that Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses . . . .”46 Ironically, this conclusion is flawed despite its viable appearance.
The Ninth Circuit erred in its review of the Act in a number of
ways. The court failed to thoroughly review the Act, the basis of the
amendment to the Act, or the subsequent changes in medical views
since the 1965 Amendment took effect. Prior to the 1965 amendment, the 1952 amendment provided that “all suspected homosexuals
attempting to enter into the U.S. were to endure an evaluation by the
Public Health Service (PHS).”47 The 1952 amendment did not expressly exclude homosexuals, but it did exclude individuals with a
psychopathic disorder or a mental defect.48 If PHS diagnosed the individual seeking admission with a psychopathic, personality, or other
condition, it issued a certificate, which “constituted the sole evidence
for exclusion or deportation of the foreign national.”49 Certificates
were routinely issued for people found to be homosexuals because
homosexuality was “classified as a psychological ailment in the Statistical and Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).”50
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,51 the Ninth Circuit held that the term
“psychopathic personality” was too vague to exclude homosexuals
because it failed to give “sufficiently definite warning” that homosexuality actually fell into the definition of this term.52 Reacting to
this holding, Congress amended the INA to exclude individuals who

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id. at 1040-41.
47
Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United States’ Immigration Law as Applied to Bi-National Same-Sex Couples: Making the Case for the Uniting
American Families Act, 18-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 302 (2009).
48
Id.
49
Lena Ayoub & Shin-Ming Wong, Separated and Unequal, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
559, 564 (2006).
50
Golden, supra note 47, at 302.
51
302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
52
Id. at 658.
45

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/19

6

Rivers: Same-Sex Couples in America

2013]

SAME-SEX COUPLES IN AMERICA

909

exhibited “sexual deviation” in 1965.53 Additionally, in 1967, the
United States Supreme Court held that “Congress used the phrase
‘psychopathic personality’ not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate
its purpose to exclude entry from all homosexuals and other sex perverts.”54
The paradigm shift began to occur in 1973 when the American Psychiatric Association determined that homosexuality was not a
clinical disorder and eliminated it from DSM-II.55 Consequently, in
1979, PHS announced that it would no longer issue certificates solely
on the basis on one’s homosexuality.56 Ironically, the Department of
Justice opined that it would continue to exclude self-proclaimed homosexuals due to Congress’s addition of the term “sexual deviation”
to the statute.57
If the Adams court would have properly analyzed the Act, it
would have realized that the exclusion of homosexuals was largely
based on the belief that homosexuality was a mental disorder, which
was manifested through sexually deviant behavior. In addition, the
court would have been cognizant that Congress’s intent was to exclude all aliens with mental disorders, not only homosexuals.58
Should the court have viewed the statute in light of the American
Psychiatric Association’s determination that homosexuality was not a
clinical disorder, the court would have recognized that the congressional intentions of the 1965 Amendment were, in fact, moot.
Additionally, if the court acknowledged Congress’s belief—
that homosexuality was a mental disorder as opposed to an exercise
of moral and social deviance—it would have analyzed section 212 of
the INA in greater detail. As a result, the court would have discovered that waivers were available which permitted persons with mental
53

Golden, supra note 47, at 302-03 (quoting Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §
15(b) (1990) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2002))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54
Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967).
55
Golden, supra note 47, at 303.
56
Id.
57
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
58
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)-(II) (2011) (stating in relevant part that “[a]ny alien . . . who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General)—(I) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed,
a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or (II) to have had a physical
or mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the disorder, which behavior has
posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others and which behavior is
likely to recur or to lead to other harmful behavior . . . .”).
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disorders to enter the United States.59 As Cynthia Reed pointed out,
the court “expressly failed to analyze discretionary waivers as evidence of Congress’s intent to allow the Attorney General to resolve
conflicts within the Act.”60 The Ninth Circuit’s failure to carefully
analyze the statute caused it to overlook the reasons why Congress
intended to exclude homosexuals, and whether the basis of the exclusion was applicable in determining how Congress intended for the
term “spouse” to be defined in INA section 201(b).
III.

DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT’S EFFECT ON BI-NATIONAL
SAME-SEX COUPLES

The rationale for the holding in Adams lost validity when
Congress enacted the Immigration Reform Act of 1990, which eliminated the statutory ground for exclusion based on “sexual deviancy.”61 This gave bi-national same-sex couples new hope. However,
this hope was diminished when President William Jefferson Clinton62
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) into law. 63 In accordance with DOMA, the federal government would only recognize
marriages entered into between one man and one woman.64 This legislation was unprecedented because this marked the first time the federal government prescribed a definition for marriage.65 With the exception of the Supreme Court’s decision holding that anti59

8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he Attorney General may waive the
application of . . . any alien who (A) is the spouse or the unmarried son or daughter, or the
minor unmarried lawfully adopted child, of a United States citizen, or of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa, (B)
has a son or daughter who is a United States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa; or (C) is a VAWA selfpetitioner, in accordance with such terms, conditions, and controls, if any . . . .”).
60
Reed, supra note 39, at 105; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)(3) (“[T]he Attorney General,
in the discretion of the Attorney General after consultation with the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, may by regulation prescribe.”).
61
Golden, supra note 47, at 304; see also Yepes-Prado v. U.S. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363, 1369
n.12 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In addition to stressing its views regarding ‘privacy and personal dignity,’ the House Report for the Reform Act stated that the amendments demonstrate ‘that the
United States does not view personal decisions about sexual orientation as a danger to other
people in our society.’ ”) (citation omitted).
62
William J. Clinton, THE WHITE HOUSE,, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/
williamjclinton (last visited May 2, 2013). William Jefferson Clinton, Democrat, was the
forty-second President of the United States. Id.
63
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
64
Golden, supra note 47, at 304.
65
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 392 (D. Mass. 2010).
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miscegenation statutes are unconstitutional, the task of defining marriage was generally left to the states.66
DOMA was Congress’s reaction to the Hawaii Supreme
Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin,67 which held that it was unlawful
sex-based discrimination for Hawaii to refuse to grant same-sex couples marriage licenses under the Hawaiian Constitution.68 Moreover,
the court held that the state is burdened with establishing that the
prohibition of same-sex marriage can pass the “strict scrutiny” standard of review.69
DOMA does two things that have had the effect of limiting
the recognition of same-sex marriages to the states that elect to recognize same-sex marriage. First, section 2 permits states, despite the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution,70 to refuse
recognition of same-sex marriages legally entered into in other
states.71 Secondly, section 3 of DOMA has the most detrimental effect on bi-national same-sex marriages as it provides that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.72
66

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of
choice [of marriage] not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
67
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
68
See id. at 67 (discussing how the voters of Hawaii voted in favor of allowing the Hawaiian State Legislature to amend the Constitution to define marriage as only between a man
and a woman); see also Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 377 n.9 (discussing that the Hawaiian constitution was amended to allow same-sex marriage following the decision in Baehr).
69
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.”).
71
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”).
72
1 U.S.C. § 7.
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In 1996, when DOMA was enacted, it had minimal effect because no state recognized same-sex marriages.73 By 2011, six states
and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage.74 Section 3 denies same-sex couples that were legally married in one of
these seven jurisdictions a myriad of federally based marriage benefits that are available for similarly situated heterosexual couples. 75 In
fact, in 1997, the General Accounting Office conducted an investigation, which found that “at least 1,049 federal laws, including those related to entitlement programs, such as Social Security, health benefits, and taxation,” are affected by DOMA.76 Beyond the restriction
of pecuniary benefits, bi-national same-sex couples have to live with
the horror of being separated from their life partner forever. DOMA
has had the effect of creating a per se rule that an American citizen
cannot enjoy the federal benefit of petitioning for their same-sex
spouse to enter the United States as an immediate relative.77
IV.

DOMA VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS EMBODIED
IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

Until recently, there have not been many judicial challenges
to DOMA. This is partially due to the fact that no one had standing
to challenge it because no state recognized same-sex marriage.78
However, section 3 of DOMA suffered its first loss when United
73

See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Fight for Marriage Rights, ‘She’s our Thurgood Marshal,’
NY TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/maine-lawyer-creditedin-fight-for-gay-marriage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating that Massachusetts became
the first state to legalize gay marriage in 2003).
74
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 377 n.9 (discussing that Iowa, New Hampshire, Connecticut,
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (2) (McKinney 2011) (“No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether
deriving from statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other
source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being or having been of the
same sex rather than a different sex.”).
75
See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“This
case arises from Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”), the operation of which required Plaintiff to pay federal estate tax on her
same-sex spouse’s estate, a tax from which similarly situated heterosexual couples are exempt.”), aff’d, 699 F. 3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
76
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
77
Id. at 395-96.
78
See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge DOMA because their same-sex marriage was not recognized by any state).
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States District Court judge, Joseph L. Tauro,79 held in Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management80 that DOMA violated “the equal protection
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.”81 Judge Tauro opined that a fundamental principle of
the Constitution is that it does not recognize or promote classes
among citizens, and it is because of this commitment to the neutral
application of law “that legislative provisions which arbitrarily or irrationally create discrete classes cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.”82
Judge Tauro analyzed the interests cited by Congress when
DOMA was enacted and the current interest the Department of Justice proffered during litigation.83 He applied the most deferential
standard of review, “rational basis scrutiny,”84 and found that no rational relationship existed between DOMA and a legitimate governmental interest.85
V.

DOMA’S ASSERTED OBJECTIVES AT THE TIME OF
ENACTMENT

In 1996, Congress cited the following as the interests it sought
to advance through the enactment of DOMA: “(1) encouraging responsible procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing
the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.”86
Even the government distanced itself from this absurd reasoning pre79

Boston: Judge Information: Tauro, Joseph L., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/tauro.htm (last visited May 2, 2013) (describing Judge
Tauro as follows: “[He] has served as a Judge of the United States District Court since 1972.
He was elevated to the position of Chief Judge in January 1992 and served in that capacity
until January 1999. His public service prior to being appointed to the bench included that as
United States Attorney for Massachusetts, Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor of Massachusetts, and two years in the Army as a Nike Guided Missile Officer”).
80
699 F. Supp. 2d 374.
81
Id. at 397; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
82
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)).
83
Id. at 388, 390.
84
See id. at 386-87 (reasoning that if a law does not “burden a fundamental right or target
a suspect class” it is to be examined under rational basis scrutiny where it will be upheld unless the challenging party can establish that the law “bears [no] rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest”).
85
Id. at 387.
86
Id. at 388.
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viously asserted by Congress.87 Nonetheless, Judge Tauro found it
necessary to invalidate all four interests cited above.88
With regard to the first interest, Judge Tauro stated that denying same-sex marriages recognition “does nothing to promote stability in heterosexual parenting.”89 DOMA only prevents children of
same-sex couples from benefiting from the numerous advantages that
flow from having married parents who are able to enjoy benefits
available under federal law.90 Moreover, “the ability to procreate is
not now, nor has it ever been, a precondition to marriage in any state
in the country. Indeed, ‘the sterile and the elderly’ have never been
denied the right to marry . . . .”91
The second interest was just as indefensible as the first. Judge
Tauro stated that “Congress’ asserted interest in defending and nurturing heterosexual marriage is not ‘grounded in sufficient factual
context [for this court] to ascertain some relation’ between it and the
classification DOMA effects.”92 Unless there is substantial evidence
that the denial of benefits will dramatically increase the likelihood
that a homosexual will choose to marry a person of the opposite sex,
it is completely irrational to believe that denying benefits to same-sex
couples, who are legally married under state law, will defend and
nurture heterosexual marriage.93 Moreover, the concept of “equal
protection of the laws” does not permit Congress to promote one
group at the expense of a politically unpopular group.94
The third interest asserted by Congress is “defending traditional notions of morality.” A remedial review of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past thirty years would reveal
that the Court’s “obligation is to define liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.”95 The fourth interest asserted, preservation of
87

Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (“For purposes of this litigation, the government has disavowed Congress’s stated justifications for the statute . . . .”).
88
See id. at 390 (“[T]he rationales asserted by Congress in support of the enactment of
DOMA are either improper or without relation to DOMA’s operation . . . .”).
89
Id. at 389.
90
Id.
91
Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
92
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 63233).
93
Id. at 389.
94
Id.
95
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
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scarce government resources, appears to be a legitimate purpose on
the surface. However, “financial considerations did not motivate the
law[,] . . . [and] the House [of Representatives] rejected a proposed
amendment to DOMA that would have required a budgetary analysis . . . .”96 Additionally, “the Congressional Budget Office concluded in 2004 that federal recognition of same-sex marriages by all fifty
states would . . . result in a net increase in federal revenue.”97
VI.

CURRENT REASONS ASSERTED IN DEFENSE OF DOMA

In Gill, the court elected to cite interests in defense of DOMA
that were different from the interests originally asserted by Congress
when DOMA was enacted. The court’s first reason was that “DOMA
was necessary to ensure consistency in the distribution of federal
marriage-based benefits.”98 It was important to the court to preserve
the “status quo” and not interfere with the “pending . . . resolution of
a socially contentious debate taking place in the states over whether
to sanction same-sex marriage.”99 The second reason asserted is that
federal agencies could not deal with the administrative burden of adjusting to the “changing patchwork of state approaches to same-sex
marriage[s].”100
Judge Tauro held that the “status quo” reasoning does not
survive rational basis scrutiny.101 Domestic Relations Law, which establishes marriage eligibility requirements, has been the “exclusive
province of the states.”102 Furthermore, “[m]arital eligibility for heterosexual couples has varied from state to state throughout the course
of history . . . [and] individual states have changed their marital eligibility requirements in a myriad [of] ways over time.”103 Yet, when it
comes to heterosexual marriages, the federal government has not had
trouble dealing with the differing marriage laws amongst the states.104
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.”); Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
96
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390 n.116.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 390.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 395 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
102
Id. at 391.
103
Id.
104
See id. (noting that the federal government has had little trouble “embrac[ing] [the]
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Furthermore, federal administrative agencies do not bear a
greater burden simply because some married “couples are of the same
sex.”105 Regardless of whether a couple is heterosexual or homosexual, the marriage license is issued by the state.106 Conversely,
DOMA adds complexity to the administrative task “by sundering the
class of state-sanctioned marriages into two, those that are valid for
federal purposes and those that are not.”107 These facts led Judge
Tauro to the logical conclusion that “DOMA does not provide for nationwide consistency in the distribution of federal benefits among
married couples.”108 “Rather it denies to same-sex married couples
the federal marriage-based benefits that similarly situated heterosexual couples enjoy.”109
VII.

DOMA IS AN INFRINGEMENT ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY

In the companion case, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services,110 Judge Tauro granted the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts’s motion for summary judgment, holding that section
3 of DOMA “encroaches upon the firmly entrenched province of the
state, and, in doing so, offends the Tenth Amendment.”111 In this litigation, Massachusetts contended that DOMA violated the “Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution, by intruding on areas of exclusive
state authority, as well as the Spending Clause, by forcing the Commonwealth to engage in invidious discrimination against its own citizens in order to receive and retain federal funds in connection
with . . . federal-state programs.”112
In opposition, the government insisted that Congress had authority under the “Spending Clause to determine how money is best
spent to promote the ‘general welfare’ of the public.”113 In South

variations and inconsistencies in state marriage laws” for heterosexuals).
105
Id. at 395.
106
Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 394.
109
Id.
110
698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
111
Id. at 253; U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”).
112
Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
113
Id. at 247.
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Dakota v. Dole,114 the United States Supreme Court held that when
Congress exercises its Spending Clause authority, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the legislation “must be in pursuit of
‘the general welfare;’ ” (2) any condition that is made applicable to
the states for the receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous
enough for “the [s]tates to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant
of the consequences of their participation;” (3) the conditions cannot
be “unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs;’ ” and (4) the legislation cannot be constitutionally impermissible.115 Judge Tauro found, based on the same reasoning utilized in Gill, that “DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on
the receipt of federal funding,” in violation of the fourth requirement
stated above.116
VIII. CURRENT IMPACT OF DOMA ON BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX
COUPLES
The Department of Justice initially filed appeals to Judge
Tauro’s decisions in Gill to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.117 However, on February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr., announced in a letter to Congress that “[a]fter
careful consideration, including review of a recommendation from
me, [President Barack Obama] has made the determination that Section 3 of [DOMA], as applied to same-sex couples who are legally
married under state law, violates the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment.”118
Attorney General Holder further stated that “the President has
instructed the Department [of Justice] not to defend [DOMA],” but
“the President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be en114

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
Id. at 207-08 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)) (quoting Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Massachusetts v. U.S., 435 U.S.
444, 461 (1978)).
116
Health and Human Servs., 698 F.Supp.2d at 249.
117
Chris Geidner, DOJ Files DOMA Defense in First Circuit Cases, METRO WEEKLY
(Jan. 13, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/01/doj-files-doma-defensein-firs.html (“Although each is slightly different, these three “rationales” do read like different shades of the same argument, which is more or less that DOMA made sense—or, is rational—because the states hadn’t reached a uniform decision.”).
118
Letter from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11ag-223.html.
115
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forced by the Executive Branch.”119 In essence, this proclamation by
the Attorney General stopped, by executive order, the Department of
Justice from raising a defense in suits where DOMA is challenged.
This was a major victory for those who oppose DOMA. However, in
reaction to the Attorney General’s letter, on April 18, 2011, led by
Speaker of the House, Representative John Boehner, the House of
Representatives Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group120 announced that
it would be hiring a law firm to defend challenges to DOMA.121
The conflict between the official positions of the House of
Representatives and the Executive Branch, combined with the current
judicial challenges to DOMA have had the effect of leaving binational same-sex couples in limbo. 122 The Director of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), John Morton, issued a memorandum instructing immigration officials to focus their “removal”123 efforts on undocumented immigrants who are criminals, gang members, or security threats.124 Additionally, he advised officials to
exercise “prosecutorial discretion” favoring undocumented immi119

Id.
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
(2013), Rule II, cl. 8, available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf (last visited May 2, 2013).
There is established an Office of General Counsel for the purpose of
providing legal assistance and representation to the House. Legal assistance and representation shall be provided without regard to political affiliation. The Office of General Counsel shall function pursuant to the
direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, which shall include the majority and minority leaderships.
The Speaker shall appoint and set the annual rate of pay for employees
of the Office of General Counsel.
Id.
121
Chris Geidner, Speaker Boehner’s DOMA Defense Lawyer, Paul Clement, is Announced and Faces Questions, METRO WEEKLY, Apr. 18, 2011, 11:02 PM,
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/04/paul-clements-defense-pro-and.html (“Word
then came that former Solicitor General Paul Clement—the top appellate litigator during part
of the George W. Bush administration—will be serving as the outside counsel to the House
BLAG in its DOMA defense . . . .”).
122
See, e.g., Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374; Health and Human Servs., 698 F.Supp. 2d 234;
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:2010cv01750 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 09, 2010);
Windsor v. U.S., No. 1:2010cv08435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 09, 2010).
123
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2011) (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall,
upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of
the . . . classes of deportable aliens.”).
124
John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Alien, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Jun. 17, 2011),
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
120
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grants who have a “spouse, child, or parent” who is a United States
citizen or who is the “primary caretaker” for one who is disabled or
ill.125
Though Director Morton’s memo does not explicitly mention
bi-national same-sex couples, it does create an environment where
enforcement of DOMA is not compulsory upon immigration officials; however, the fates of bi-national same-sex couples are left to
the subjective attitudes of various immigration officials. 126 Furthermore, non-citizen same-sex spouses of United States citizens still will
not be granted the legal status typically afforded to immigrants who
have heterosexual spouses.127 Thus, until the DOMA issue is resolved, bi-national same-sex couples will not enjoy the same rights as
similarly situated bi-national heterosexual couples.
IX.

UNITING AMERICAN FAMILIES ACT

It is painfully apparent that DOMA is a contentious issue and
the uncertainty surrounding its validity will likely be resolved in the
near future.128 In the meantime, many bi-national same-sex couples
will have to live with the anxiety that is born from the fear that their
family may be permanently severed one day because the non-citizen
partner cannot gain legal status. However, a solution may be on the
horizon. The Uniting American Families Act (“UAFA”) is intended

125

Id.
When weighing whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be
warranted for a given alien, ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . whether the
person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent[;
and] whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a mental or physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative . . . .

Id.
126

Id.
Compare Mallory Simon, Same-Sex Couples Fight for Immigration Rights,
CNNPOLITICS.COM (Jun. 3, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/03/
same.sex.immigration/index.html?_s=PM:POLITICS (discussing how federal immigration
laws do not allow United States citizens to “sponsor their foreign-born same-sex partners for
citizenship as a man may do for his wife or a woman for her husband”), with Morton, supra
note 124.
128
On Wednesday, March 27, 2013, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments challenging the key section of DOMA that prohibits the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages in the case of United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307). Audio highlights from DOMA oral
argument, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=161937.
127
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to remedy this issue by amending the INA to include “permanent
partners.”129
The UAFA defines “permanent partner” as:
[A]n individual 18 years of age or older who—”(A) is
in a committed, intimate relationship with another individual 18 years of age or older in which both parties
intend a lifelong commitment; “(B) is financially interdependent with that other individual; “(C) is not
married to or in a permanent partnership with anyone
other than that other individual; “(D) is unable to contract with that other individual a marriage cognizable
under this Act; and “(E) is not a first, second, or third
degree blood relation of that other individual.”130
The proposed legislation is not intended to alter DOMA and
how it functions.131 The federal benefits afforded to legally married
heterosexuals are not extended to same-sex couples under the
UAFA.132 Instead, it is intended to operate within the confines of
DOMA by including permanent partners to the list of immigrants that
a U.S. citizen can file a petition for as an immediate relative.133
As expected, there are many who oppose this amendment to
the INA for a variety of reasons. The chairman of the Catholic Bishops’ Committee of Migration, Bishop John C. Wester, stated that the
Act “would ‘erode the institution of marriage and family’ by taking a
position ‘that is contrary to the very nature of marriage which predates the Church and the State.’ ”134 Additionally, in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Executive Director of
NumbersUSA, Roy Beck, testified that the UAFA and other legisla-

129

H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (describing a bill proposed by Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York, which amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to accommodate same-sex partners.); see also S. 424, 111th Cong. (2009).
130
H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
131
Golden, supra note 47, at 319.
132
Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Dir. of the Washington Legislative Office of the
Am. Civil Liberties Union, to the United States Senate (Jun. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file966_39743.pdf.
133
Id. (“If enacted, UAFA would require bi-national same-sex couples to meet the same
standards as opposite-sex couples. For example, same-sex couples would be required to
produce evidence of their relationship, such as affidavits from friends or family, and evidence of financial interdependence.”).
134
Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/us/politics/03immig.html?_r=1.
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tion that will potentially increase the number of green cards issued
will have a negative impact because “every new adult permanently
added to the U.S. population through immigration legislation would
be a potential competitor to unemployed and underemployed American workers. And every new immigrant increases the total U.S. carbon footprint and ecological footprint . . . .”135 Others argue that that
the UAFA will result in an increase in visa fraud.136
The argument that this Act will “erode the institution of marriage and family” is unfounded. Nuclear families are not the only
families entitled to constitutional recognition.137 An essential principle of the United States immigration policy is preserving family unity. “Yet gay and lesbian Americans are still forced to choose between their country and being with those they love. This destructive
policy tears families apart and forces hardworking Americans to
make the heart-wrenching choice to leave the country . . . .”138 The
impact of the separation of bi-national same-sex couples does not only affect the individuals involved in the relationship but will also affect the adopted children of these couples who will surely suffer tremendous emotional harm resulting from the forced severance of their
families.139
There may or may not be rational arguments that increases in
immigration have the potential to strain the resources of the United
States. However, these arguments do not defeat the overwhelming
goal of family reunification already built into the INA. When President George H.W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990 140 into
law, he stated that “the law ‘maintains our Nation’s historic commitment to family reunification by increasing the number of immigrant
135

No New Categories of Immigration Should be Considered Until Overall Green Card
Numbers Are Dramatically Reduced: Hearings on S. 424 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Roy Beck, Executive Director of
NumbersUSA), available at http://www.numbersusa.com/content/nusablog/beckr/june-22009/my-testimony-today-senate-judiciary-committee-asks-decisions-be-made-nati.
136
Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont when re-introducing the UAFA).
137
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
138
Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont when re-introducing the UAFA).
139
Elizabeth Ricci, Will Binational Same-Sex Couples Get Justice?, GAY AND LESBIAN
REV., Jul. 1, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 14289846.
140
Immigration Act 1990, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=84ff95c4f635f010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b328194d3e88
d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD (last visited May 2, 2013).
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visas allocated on the basis of family ties.’ ”141
Moreover, Congress’s intent to maintain family unity is apparent. The INA permits “children, spouses and parents” of United
States citizens to gain immediate legal permanent residency.142 It also permits adult children of United States citizens and brothers and
sisters of United States citizens to enter the United States “subject to
the worldwide level . . . [of] family-sponsored immigrants.”143 It is
clear that unifying families has and continues to take precedence over
economic concerns. In addition, the argument that there will be an
increase in visa fraud if the UAFA is enacted does not prevail. A
permanent partner will be subject both to the same scrutiny as a partner in a heterosexual marriage and to the same marriage fraud penalties.144
The UAFA does not grant immediate relief for bi-national
same-sex couples from all of the ills of DOMA. It is an imperfect solution that arguably promotes the notion that gays and lesbians are to
be treated as second-class citizens, and that their marriages should
not be recognized as real marriages. At the same time, it does create
an avenue for the families of bi-national same-sex couples to remain
intact until the nation advances enough to repeal DOMA, legislatively or judicially.
X.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that bi-national same-sex couples are not afforded the same rights as similarly situated heterosexual couples. However, since Adams was decided in 1982, stronger arguments have developed that bi-national same-sex marriages should be recognized for
immigration purposes. First, the ambiguity regarding the exclusion
of homosexuals as part of the “sexual deviancy” exclusion was eliminated by the Immigration Reform Act of 1990. This invalidated the
court’s rationale in Adams that since homosexuals are excludable
they cannot be considered “spouses” for immigration purposes.
Second, there are now states in the union that recognize same141
Matthew J. Hrutkay, Note, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses,”
But Not Your Homosexual Partners: International Solutions to America’s Same-Sex Immigration Dilemma, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 98 (2010) (citation omitted).
142
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
143
8 U.S.C. § 1153.
144
Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont when re-introducing the UAFA).
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sex marriages. This invalidates the other portion of the rationale in
Adams that gave recognition to the common usage of the word
spouse. The recognition of same-sex marriage in some states has had
the effect of including same-sex couples in the definition of spouse,
which is simply defined as a married person.145
Though the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Adams has been invalidated, United States citizens still do not have the right to petition for
their same-sex partners to enter the United States as an immediate
relative. This is mainly due to section 3 of DOMA, which mandates
that the federal government must grant recognition to heterosexual
marriages and must deny federal marriage benefits to same-sex couples. At the same time, Judge Tauro’s decisions in Gill declared
DOMA unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and infringes on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.146
Additionally, the Obama administration announced that it has found
DOMA to be unconstitutional, and the Department of Justice announced that it will discontinue its current defense of section 3 of
DOMA, and will not defend DOMA in future litigation.147
The UAFA is a viable alternative for bi-national same-sex
couples while the legality of DOMA is pending. The UAFA is intended to work within the limitations of DOMA. Though the UAFA
does not afford bi-national same-sex couples the same rights afforded
to bi-national heterosexual couples, it does create an option that prevents the devastating effect of forced severance of families. Ultimately, there is no reasonable basis for the denial of immigration
benefits to bi-national same-sex couples. Yet, legally married binational same-sex couples are forced to live with the fear of having
their families permanently separated. It would be unthinkable for
heterosexual couples to endure. This harmful and unreasonable distinction between similarly situated people should be eliminated.

145

MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spouse (last
visited May 2, 2013).
146
Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248, 253.
147
Letter from Att’y Gen., Eric Holder, to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense
of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/
11-ag-223.html.
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